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FOREWORD
Space shuttle characteristics are expected to allow selective easing
of many cost-inducing criteria now required of payloads placed in orbit by
expendable launch systems. Of particular interest is the prerequisite of
identifying and differentiating between the minimum, mandatory design and
verification criteria for sortie payloads and all other criteria for pay-
load projects.
The TRW Systems Group under two concurrent contracts to NASA/JSC
(NAS9-12741 and NAS9-12742) has performed a combined study effort entitled
"Space Shuttle Sortie Payload Crew Safety and Systems Compatibility Criteria"
for the express purpose of addressing the determination of mandatory and
discretionary design and verification criteria applicable to sortie pay-
loads from operational space shuttle management viewpoint. The study pro-
jects were performed during the period from 16 May 1972 through 15 May 1973.
The studies were sponsored jointly by NASA Headquarter's Mission and
Payload Integration Office of the Office of Manned Space Flight, and the
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center's Engineering and Development Directorate.
Study direction was provided by Mr. Earle M. Crum of the Future Programs
Division, Payloads Engineering Office. He was assisted by a NASA
Management Team representing NASA Headquarters, Johnson Space; Kennedy
Space; Langley Research; Lewis Research; and Marshall Space Flight Centers.
The results of these studies are documented in the following three
volumes:
Space Shuttle Sortie Payload Crew Safety and Systems
Compatibility Criteria Documentation
Volume Title Document No.
I Executive Summary 22214/22215-H013-RO-00
II Crew Safety Design and 22214-H014-RO-0
Verification Criteria
III Systems Compatibility Design 22215-H014-RO-00
and Verification Criteria
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1. INTRODUCTION
NASA is currently examining shuttle payload costs in an effort to
predict more accurately and reduce such costs. History indicates that the
criteria applied by NASA to previous space payloads caused them to be quite
expensive. This practice was acceptable considering the costs associated
with the launch and the necessity for a high probability of mission success.
However, when these costs are used to estimate the cost of future shuttle
payloads, it is evident that there would soon be a cost factor limiting
the use of the shuttle.
Fortunately, the shuttle characteristics will allow selectively easing
many of the cost-inducing criteria now placed on expendable launch system
payloads. Relaxing these criteria is expected to greatly reduce the cost
of space payload development.
Central to those cost-reducing efforts must be the capability to
identify and differentiate between the minimum, mandatory design and veri-
fication criteria for shuttle sortie payloads and all other candidate
criteria for payload projects. Accordingly these two studies will con-
tribute to lower sortie payload costs by producing a methodology capable
of defining the minimum mandatory criteria required for crew safety
(NAS9-12742) and systems compatibility (NAS9-12741) of sortie payloads.
The resulting criteria will form the basis of future specifications to be
developed when quantitative space shuttle data are available.
1
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2. OBJECTIVES
The prime objective of these studies was to identify the minimum,
mandatory design and verification criteria necessary to insure that sortie
payloads are safe (from a flight personnel standpoint) and compatible with
the space shuttle system. These mandatory criteria must be distinguished
from all other criteria related to payload mission success, configuration
choices or management approaches which are, therefore, discretionary to
payload management as variables in cost-benefit trades. Specific study
objectives are tabulated in Table 2-1.
Table 2-1. Specific Study Objectives
* Research, identify, and analyze past practices in analogous payload
situations to establish a historical perspective and to utilize
available experience.
* Establish categorizing processes for distinguishing between shuttle
mandatory and discretionary design and verification criteria.
* Identify the mandatory design and verification criteria that are
required by shuttle management to insure crew safety and systems com-
,patibility of sortie payloads with the space shuttle system.
* Identify the design and verification criteria that are discretionary
to payload management as variables in cost-benefit trades.
PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FIMED
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3. STUDY SCOPE
The scope of these studies is bounded by the sortie payload philosophy
shown in Figure 3-1. A shuttle sortie payload may consist of one or more
major payload elements. These elements remain attached to the orbiter at
all times and therefore do not include propulsion systems or free-flying
satellites. A given sortie payload may interface with the shuttle mission
specialist station (MSS) or payload specialist station (PSS) and excludes
a remote manipulator system. Several pallets of experimental equipment may
reside in the payload bay as well as piggy-back package(s). Additionally,
as in Skylab, some experiment equipments may also be included in the
shuttle crew compartments.
Accordingly, the design criteria derived by these studies are appli-
cable to sortie payload elements carried in the shuttle payload bay or in
the crew compartments.
Piggy-Back Additional
PSS Panels Package Pallet
-4-
Experiment
Equipment
Figure 3-1. Shuttle Sortie Payload Elements
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Because, in general, sortie payloads are pre-phase A in development, a
generalized sortie payload was conceived against which a preliminary hazard
analysis and an interface design analysis were made. This generalized pay-
load model contained the subsystems and considerations known to be included
in a representative sortie payload and is summarized below in Table 3-1.
Wherever possible, items are listed under their usual subsystems
(mechanical, controls and displays, thermal, pneumatics, instruments,
pointing/aiming, pyrotechnics, and electrical/electronic) for interface
study purposes. Because crew safety analyses treat hazard considerations
that stem not only from these subsystem considerations, but other space
flight factors also, various non-subsystem considerations were included
(material, energy sources, agents, crew involvement and environment) to
complete the model. Note that entries are not redundantly listed in
Table 3-1. For example, a pressure vessel appears as a pneumatic sub-
system component and is not duplicated as an energy source although it
would be so considered in a hazard analysis. Likewise, payload nuclear
particle sources (radioactive) outweigh their possible high temperature
characteristics for Table 3-1 purposes.
Table 3-1. Generalized Sortie Payload Subsystems and Considerations
MATERIAL THERMAL INSTRUMENTS ELECTRICAL/ELECTRONIC
-Metal -Conduction -Data Circuitry -Power Circuitry
-Plastic -Liquid Loop/ -Transducers -Batteries
-Composite Cold Plate -Electrical -Power Supplies
Material -Heaters Instruments -RF Transmitters
-Insulation -Sensors
-Radiation
AGENTS CREW INVOLVEMENT
MECHANICAL PNEUMATICS -Reagents -EVA/IVA
-Hatch 
-Pressure-Pathogens 
-Control Dis-
-Structures Vessels 
-Fuels & play Interface
-Cryogenic Cooler e Oxidizers -Direct
-Extendable Booms -Extending -Fluids & Gases Operation-Extenda Mechanisms -Corrosive Operation
-Antenna -Valves & Lines -Corrosive
-Shields -Compressors
-Hydraulics
ENVIRONMENT
ENERGY SOURCES POINTING/AIMING -Pressure
-X-Ray -Vibration
-X-Ray 
-Gimballed 
-Acceleration
CONTROLS & DISPLAYS -Magnetic Flux Platforms -Thermal
-Control Stimuli -Radio Frequency -CMG -Humidity
-Display -Payload Gener- -GN&C Data -Acoustical
-Display ated Nuclear
Responses Particles -Gravity
-Computer -Laser -Natural
Operations PYROTECHNICS Radiation
-Devices -Contamination
-Meteoroid
4
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The basic guidelines employed in the studies are summarized in Table
3-2.
Table 3-2. Study Guidelines
* These studies address the post R&D, operational shuttle era assuming a mature, fixed-design,
"shuttle airlines" flight operations capability oriented to low-complexity, low-cost operations.
* Design and test considerations include only those imposed by the space shuttle for mission
purposes and are confined within the limits from terminal countdown through a normal landing.
* Whether payload equipment is from the civilian sector or GFE should not alter the applica-
bility of the shuttle imposed mandatory criteria. The payload should be given maximum
possible latitude.
* Extravehicular activity (EVA) requirements are not excluded from a sortie payload. However,
shuttle EVA equipment are excluded from assignment to the payload.
* Study definitions:
- Criteria are general rules by which the acceptability of shuttle payloads may be determined.
- Specifications are the translations of criteria into explicit, usually quantitative, state-
ments suitable for detailed design and test purposes. A criterion may translate into
several specifications.
- Requirements may be criteria or specifications which have been imposed by appropriate
administrative authority.
- Crew safety involves those payload design features that must be satisfied so that any
credible hazard (i.e., believable as proven by experience or analytical techniques) is
eliminated or its expectancy reduced to acceptable limits of risk.
- Hazards are events or conditions that could cause death or serious injury to one or more of
the orbiter personnel through either direct means or indirectly via propagation of vehicle
hardware damage (other non-crew-hazard hardware safety considerations are treated as systems
compatibility).
- Mandatory crew safety design criteria and verification levels are defined, levied and
controlled by shuttle management and are obligatory to all sortie payload elements.
- Orbiter/payload interface is a point (or area) where a physical relationship exists between
the orbiter and payload, or between major payload elements, wherein physical and/or
functional compatibility is required.
- Systems compatibility involves those payload interface design features that must be satis-
fied so that the payload elements and the orbiter can function together within acceptable
degrees of mutual tolerance. Compatibility between payload elements is defined to en-
compass the same considerations as those between the payload and the orbiter.
- Mandatory systems compatibility design criteria and verification levels are defined, levied
and controlled by shuttle management and are obligatory to all sortie payload elements.
However, certain of these criteria that affect only the payload may be controlled by pay-
load management.
- Discretionary design criteria make up all other criteria. Implementation and verification
of these criteria are subject to payload project management prerogatives.
5
22214/22215-HO13-RO-00
4. SIGNIFICANT RESULTS
4.1 CATEGORIZING METHODOLOGY
Using a logic tree approach, categorizing methodology was devised
that has resulted in three different categorizing processes; crew safety
design criteria; systems compatibility design criteria; and a design
criteria verification process. The logic tree technique was chosen for
its objectivity in determining mandatory criteria now -- and in future
use. Associated with each categorizing process are basic study guidelines
as listed in Section 3 and specific assumptions outlined in Volumes II
and III.
4.1.1 Crew Safety Design Criteria Process
Figure 4-1 shows, in conceptual form, an overview of the detailed
categorizing methodology for crew safety design criteria presented in
Volume II of this report.
DISCRETIONARY
NO 1 2 NO 3
DOES THIS IF THIS CRITERION IS NOT
CRITERION SHOULD THIS APPLIED, WOULD MISSION
CANDIDATE CONTROL, OR HAZARD OCCUR, TERMINATION BE REQUIRED
DESIGN LIMIT, A YES IS A SAFE YES BECAUSE OF ANY OF THESE
CRITERION BOUNDED HAZARD MISSION CREW CONDITIONS?
INJURIOUS TO TERMINATION DEATHINJURIOUS TO POSSIBLE? SERIOUS/PERMANENT INJURY
THE CREW? MAJOR MEDICAL NEEDS
MANDATORY
Figure 4-1. Crew Safety Categorizing Process Concept
This process is designed to determine whether a candidate safety
design criterion is a member of the mandatory or discretionary sets.
The philosophy around which the crew safety process is built demands that a
6
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subject hazard be credible and that it threaten crew safety rather than
solely hardware. An unsafe mission termination is a major factor affecting
crew safety as in block 2 of Figure 4-1. Block 3 defines the degree of
potential seriousness resulting from the hazard under design consideration
by the candidate criterion. Thus, mandatory crew safety design criteria
can be separated from all other criteria that address cost-benefit factors
such as payload mission success, configuration choices and other project
management prerogatives.
4.1.2 Systems Compatibility Design Criteria Process
An overview of the detailed categorizing methodology for systems com-
patibility design criteria, presented in Volume III of this report, is
depicted in conceptual form by Figure 4-2. Using a similar methodology,
this process is designed to determine whether a candidate systems com-
patibility design criterion is a member of the mandatory or discretionary
sets.
NOT SAFETY
APPLICABLE CRITERION
NO 1 2 YES 3
DOES THIS COULD THE COULD A
CRITERION PAYLOAD/ORBITER CREW HAZARD
CANDIDATEADDRESS A YES FUNCTION YES RESULT IF
DESIGN DEFINED NOMINALLY IF THIS CRITERION
CRITERION COMPATIBILITY THIS CRITERION WERE NOT
INTERFACE? WERE NOT SATISFIED? SATISFIED?
MANDATORY DISCRETIONARY
Figure 4-2. Systems Compatibility Categorizing Process Concept
The compatibility study determined that compatibility design criteria
involve system interfaces and interactions between the orbiter, payload
and the environment. Therefore, this process philosophy demands that a
candidate design criterion address a real hardware interface or interaction
7
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between systems rather than an operating procedure. As emphasized in block
2, the ability to function nominally on both sides of the orbiter-payload
systems interface is mandatory. Finally, block 3 shows that the degree one
considers contingency, or non-nominal, interface situations is clearly a
matter of discretionary cost-benefit trades; or, a safety matter originating
from a possible incompatibility consequence.
4.1.3 Design Criteria Verification Process
A single process to determine the need for mandatory testing has
resulted for the verification of a crew safety or a systems compatibility
mandatory design criterion. This common process, oriented to a design
criterion, is presented in Figure 4-3.
1 2
MANDATORY VERIFY VERIFY
DESIGN BY BY
CRITERION SIMILARITY? ANALYSIS?
YES YES
3
TESTING VERIFY
YES BY
INSPECTION?
YES 5 YES 4
TESTING VERIFY VERIFY
IS BY BY
ANATORY COMBINATION? DEMONSTRATION?
Figure 4-3. Design Criterion Verification Process Concept
The process contends (in blocks 1 through 5) that commensurate with
the accumulated NASA manned spaceflight experience, verification techniques
other than testing should be emphasized to reduce payload costs. Addition-
ally, since orbiter program management has commissioned two, minimum,
8
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mandatory sets of design criteria sufficient to assure crew safety and
systems compatibility, it follows that only these criteria require obli-
gatory, shuttle-defined verification (for orbiter management overview
purposes). All other criteria (discretionary) may be verified at a cost
level according to the same cost-benefit factors that guided their imple-
mentation.
4.2 CRITERIA OVERVIEW
4.2.1 Organization
To gain from past experiences and recommend safety and compatibility
precedent practices applicable to the operational shuttle era, sixteen
previous space programs and five recent safety studies were analyzed and
are presented in Table 4-1. A majority of the design criteria synthesized
from these studies evolved from nearly 600 safety and 350 compatibility
specifications, requirements, guidelines and criteria derived from the
precedent practices analysis. However, to provide assurance that the
shuttle/sortie payload general interfaces and hazard considerations were
as complete as possible, a preliminary hazard analysis and an interface
design analysis were conducted which produced additional design criteria.
Table 4-1. Historical Perspective Baseline
MANNED ELEMENTS UNMANNED ELEMENTS
* APOLLO SIM * SCOUT
* ALSEP e DELTA
* SKYLAB * CENTAUR
e MOL * TITAN IIIC
* P&F SUBSAT. * PIONEER F&G
* HEAO
* VELA
AIRBORNE ELEMENTS * OGO
* M35
* ARC ASP (990/LEAR)
* JSC ERAP
NASA SAFETY STUDIES
* Advanced Mission Safety (HQ/AC)
* Preliminary Hazard Analysis of Space Shuttle
Payloads and Payload Interfaces (JSC/BC)
* Safety in Earth Orbit (JSC/RI)
* MSF Nuclear Safety (MSFC/GE)
* System Safety Guidelines for New Space
Operations Concepts (MSFC/LMSC)
9
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4.2.2 Results
Figure 4-4 depicts the hazard and interface areas found applicable to
these shuttle/sortie payload studies within the guidelines presented in
Section 3. The hazard areas listed in Figure 4-4 are aligned to the
standard areas for safety analyses and stem from NASA/Headquarters Safety
Program Directive No. 1A. To assure similar usability of the compatibility
criteria, the compatibility interface areas were defined to be congruent
with the shuttle development approach and assignment of subsystem managers
by JSC. Figure 4-4 also shows the number of minimum mandatory design
criteria identified by these studies.
CREW SAFETY DESIGN CRITERIA COMPATIBILITY DESIGN CRITERIA
BY HAZARD AREA BY INTERFACE AREA
9 - Contamination/Toxicity 4 - Communications
3 - Electric Shock 1 - Cryogenics
15 - Energy Source Isolation 1 - Data Processing & S/W
20 - EVA/IVA 
- 1 - Displays & Controls
9 - Explosive Devices 4 - Electrical Power
8 - Fire I - EC/LS
2 - Fuels and Oxidizers I - EVA/IVA
13 - Ionizing Radiation 2 - GN&C
4 - Materials Compatibility 1 - Instrumentation
14 - Pressure Vessels I - Onboard Checkout
6 - Structural 1 - Payload Environment
5 - Systems Interactions 1 - Pyrotechnics
9 - Structures
2 - Thermal Control
4 - General
108 Minimum Mandatory 34 Minimum Mandatory
Criteria Criteria
Figure 4-4. Design Criteria Organization and Results
* Includes nuclear devices
10
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4.2.3 Summary
Unlike design activities, the verification of design criteria compliance
is performed by a well-defined set of techniques (similarity, analysis, in-
spection, demonstration, test). Therefore, to aid.clarity of presentation the
following crew safety and systems compatibility design criteria summaries do
not include the selected verification levels which can be found in Volumes
II (Crew Safety) and III (Systems Compatibility) of this report.
Presented in Table 4-2 is a summary of the 132 crew safety design cri-
teria contained in Section 6 of Volume II. Table 4-2 shows the criteria sub-
ject that is addressed within each of the 12 hazard areas.
Table 4-3 presents a summary of the 41 systems compatibility design cri-
teria contained in Section 5 of Volume III. The specific design considera-
tions that were addressed within each interface area are itemized in Table
4-3. Certain Volume III systems compatibility criteria (that specifically
address the orbiter) must also be considered to assure total safety of the
flight crew and passengers from hazardous hardware incompatibilities. Volume
III criteria also reflect, to a limited degree, certain hardware safety items.
Thus, both volumes together comprise a systems safety approach.
These crew safety and systems compatibility criteria may form the basis
for future sortie payload specifications to be developed when quantitative
shuttle data are available.
11
Table 4-2. Crew Safety Design Criteria Summary
EXPLOSIVE DEVICES (10) ELECTRIC SHOCK (3) ENERGY SOURCE ISOLATION (21)
* Inadvertent firing 3M, -- * High Voltages IM, -- * Batteries iM --
* Misfire 411, 1D e Isolation, Grounding 2M, -- e Short-Circuit Protection 6M,1D
* Device Size IM, -- * Overload Protection 2M,1D
e Byproduct Containment IM, -- * Open-Circuit Protection --,2D
* EMI 1M,2D
* Arcing lM,--
* Redundancy lM,--
* Safing Mechanisms 3M,--
* Thermal Extremes --,2D
* Contamination -- ,ID
EVA/IVA (22) MATERIALS COMPATIBILITY (4) IONIZING RADIATION* (17)
* Thermal Extreme IM,-- * Galvanic Corrosion 1M, -- * Containment IM, --
* Inadvertent Actuation 3 ,-- * Stress lM, -- * Activation --, 1D
a Handling 3M,-- * Incompatible Materials 111, -- * Cooling ' 1l, --
* Leak Detection lM,-- * Oxidizing or Insulating ll, -- * Coolant Leaks 21, --
* Safina 2M,-- * Fire 1M -- --
e Failure Identification IM,-- * Radiation 31, --
* Restraint/Tethers 2M,lD * Monitor/Control 3M, --
* Lighting I1,-- * Jettison/Recovery 1M1, 3D
* Isolation protection 21,-- • Decontamination M, --
* Containment 2M,1D
* Emergency Life Support lM,-- )
* Sound Pressure Level M,-- o
M = Mandatory D = Discretionary *Includes nuclear devices
Table 4-2. Crew Safety Design Criteria Summary (Concluded)
CONTAMINATION/TOXICITY (9) FIRE (9) FUELS 9, OXIDIZERS (2)
* Leak/Spill Prevention 2M, -- * Source Limiting 1M, -- * Leak/Vent 1M, --
& Detection
* Self Extinguishing 1M, -- * Cleanliness 1M, --
* Gas/Vapor Generation lM, --
* High Temp. Isolation 1M, ID
* Isolation 2M, --
* Open Flame 2M, --
* Outgassing IM, --
* Suppression 3M, --
* Particulates lM, --
* Micro-Biology 2M, --
PRESSURE VESSELS (22) STRUCTURAL (8) SYSTEMS INTERACTIONS (5)
* Relief Capability 5M, lD * Fragmentation IM, -- * Monitoring/Control 5M, --
* Fastening 1M, -- • Manned Volume Walls -- , 1D
* Quick Disconnect -- I, D * Extension/Jettison 1T, 1D
e Valves IM, -- * Securing 2M, --
* Pressure Integrity 5M, 5D e Container Integrity IM, --
a Monitoring IM,-- * Meteoroid Environment 1M, --
* Dumping IM, --
* Overpressure -- , D
M = Mandatory D = Discretionary O
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Table 4-3. Systems Compatibility Design Criteria Summary
COMMUNICATIONS (4) ECLS (1) PYROTECHNICS (1)
* Commands IM,-- * Atmospheric Maintenance IM,-- * Generated Environment IM,--
-Uplink -Contamination
-PCDS EVA/IVA (I) -Shock
-Onboard -Thrust
* TV Payloads lM,-- * Astronaut Capabilities iM,--
-Hardware 
-Reach
-Signal Characteristics 
-Visibility
* Voice IM,-- -Torque/Force STRUCTURES (10)
* Carrier Frequencies IM,-- -Transferables
* Mounting Provisions IM,--
GN&C (2) -Location, Attachment
CRYOGENICS (1) * Orientation & Ai:gnment IM,--
* Realtime Data oM,-- * Orbiter-Induc(J Environ.IM,--
* Reactants IM,-- -Data Characteristics -Acceleration
-Purity * Pointing/Stabilizing lM,-- -Shock
-Cleanliness -Accuracy -Vibration
-Stability 
-Acoustical
-Deadband 
-Thermal
-Nuclear Radiation
DATA PROCESSING & SOFTWARE (1) INSTRUMENTATION (6) -Magnetic Fields
-Contamination
a Computation Support IM,-- a Downlink IM,-- -Structural Distortion
-RAU e P/L Envelope & Mass
-Hardware Properties lM,--
-Signal Characteristics * Boom-Mounted Equipment IM,--
DISPLAY & CONTROL (1) * Transducers --,lD * Fields-of-View IM,--
-Operating Range * Materials lM,--
* Panels IM,-- -Resolution a Flaking lM,--
-Hardware o Telemetry --,4D * Service Panels lM,--
-Electrical Characteristics @ Decompression --,ID
ONBOARD CHECKOUT (2)
ELECTRICAL POWER (4) e Go/No-Go Criteria lM,--
-Checkout Command Decoder THERMAL CONTROL (2)
* Power Sources lM,-- -Stored Program Processor
-Hardware 9 Payload Viewing --,lD * Heat Transport IM,--
-Vol tage
-Voltage -Coldplate Hardware
-Transients
- Temperature Limits lM,--
-Impedance P/L ENVIRONMENT (1)
-Grounding
* EMC and RF IM,-- a Natural Environment iM,--
-Conducted -Low-g & Pressure
-Radiated -Space Radiation GENERAL (4)
a P/L-Induced
Characteristics lM,-- -Space Thermal
-Load Impedance -Meteoroid * Orbiter Support Limits IM,--
-Transients -Space Magnetic Fields * P/L-Induced Forces,
Impulses IM,--
-Capacitance -Humidity * P/L Induced
-Feedback -Solar Illumination Environments IM,--
e Corona lM,-- -Contaminations a Waste Storage IM,--
M = Mandatory D = Discretionary
14
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5. RECOMMENDATIONS
As a result from these two, concurrent study efforts, TRW Systems
submits the following recommendations for NASA consideration:
I. An investigation should be made of policies and requirement-type
documents that impact spacecraft and payload design. These
studies revealed that this category of documents strongly reflect
only past practices. Therefore, their impact on the operational
shuttle era philosophies, in terms of costs and schedule, should
be analyzed and corrective action outlined.
2. Other classes of shuttle payloads, such as kick-stages and free-
flying satellites, should be studied in terms of minimum safety
and systems compatibility design criteria. The basic categorizing
methodology developed via these studies could provide the initial
basis for an expanded methodology capable of treating any shuttle
payload criteria.
3. Other aerospace disciplines (i.e., reliability, quality assurance)
have traditionally provided obligatory impact to payload develop-
ment for manned spacecraft. A better determination of their roles
in the shuttle operational era should be undertaken with specific
emphasis on shuttle payloads.
4. NASA/JSC has produced a substantial set of safety requirements
and guidelines. These data should be compiled into one source
document to improve the efficiency of contractual levying and to
reduce the frequency of detailed hazard analyses except where new
designs are being implemented.
5. An additional study should be undertaken to provide a Systems Safety
approach for shuttle sortie payloads that combines both the crew
safety criteria and the appropriate systems compatibility criteria
into one set. This study should also take.into consideration the
safety aspects of payload operations.
6. Requirement specifications should be developed from these crew
safety and systems compatibility criteria and incorporated, as
applicable, into all sortie payload development programs.
15
